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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a new win-rate based bid shading algorithm
(WR) that does not rely on theminimum-bid-to-win feedback from a
Sell-Side Platform (SSP). The method uses a modified logistic regres-
sion to predict the profit from each possible shaded bid price. The
function form allows fast maximization at run-time, a key require-
ment for Real-Time Bidding (RTB) systems. We report production
results from this method along with several other algorithms. We
found that bid shading, in general, can deliver significant value
to advertisers, reducing price per impression to about 55% of the
unshaded cost. Further, the particular approach described in this
paper captures 7% more profit for advertisers, than do benchmark
methods of just bidding the most probable winning price. We also
report 4.3% higher surplus than an industry Sell-Side Platform shad-
ing service. Furthermore, we observed 3% – 7% lower eCPM, eCPC
and eCPA when the algorithm was integrated with budget con-
trollers. We attribute the gains above as being mainly due to the
explicit maximization of the surplus function, and note that other
algorithms can take advantage of this same approach.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing → Online auctions; • Information
systems→Display advertising; •Computingmethodologies
→Machine learning algorithms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online Advertising auctions have been dominated by Second Priced
Auctions (SPAs) since their early implementations in the 1990s.
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Google famously used Second Price Auctions for its Adwords and
Adsense auctions, and, in 2017, generated 90% of its revenue from
Second Price Auctions [12]. However, there was a dramatic shift
in online advertising between 2018 and 2019. As of 2020, almost
all major display ad auctions have switched from Second to First
Price Auctions (FPAs) [13, 14]. Several factors conspired to drive
the industry towards the adoption of FPA, including the widespread
growth of header bidding with its incompatibility with SPAs [18],
increased demand for transparency and accountability [7, 11, 26, 29],
and yield concerns [3, 21, 25].
Unfortunately for advertisers, First Price Auctions leave private
value bidders susceptible to over-paying. For instance, if the bidder’s
private value of an impression was $10.00, and the winner knew
the second placed bidder’s price was just $1.00, they could bid just
$1.01 and effectively collect a $8.99 profit. If they instead bid their
private value, they would be charged the entirety of the $10.00 and
they would have $0 profit!
The practice of strategically decreasing bid price below the
buyer’s private value is known as bid shading. Bid shading has
been observed in a variety of real world auctions including FCC
Spectrum [6], US Oil Deposits [5], Cattle auctions [8], US Trea-
sury auctions [17] and others. Despite its widespread use, there has
been little work done on methods to systematically exploit shading,
particularly when data is available to make it possible to predict
auction clearing prices.
2 THE BID SHADING PROBLEM
Given bid request bi , and a valuation Vi , if we won the impression,
which represents how much the advertiser expects to capture from
the impression, howmuch should the advertiser discount their valu-
ation? Assuming that the valuationVi is an accurate representation
of the dollar value that the advertiser expects to obtain, and the bid
bi = дiVi is also in real dollars, the advertiser’s financial gain, or
surplus, is equal to:
surplus
def
=
∑
i
(Vi − дiVi ) I(дiVi > bˆi ), (1)
whereдi ∈ (0, 1] is the shading factor to apply to the bidder’s private
value Vi , bˆi is the minimum bid price to win, and I(bi > bˆi ) = 1 if
the impression is won, and 0 otherwise. The task is to find a shading
factor дi that maximizes the surplus to the advertiser.
3 PREVIOUS WORK
3.1 Bid Shading Theory
Bid shading is a common tactic in repeated First Price Auctions. [36]
found robust evidence of shading in Austrian livestock auctions ,
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[8] reported shading in a Texas cattle market, and [17] found the
practice in auctions for US Treasury notes.
Auctions generally need to be repeated and predictable for bid
shading to be practically feasible, but under these conditions, it
often occurs organically. Pownall and Wolk (2013) showed that bid
shading for repeated internet auction prices increased over time; by
about 26% after 10 iterations [24]. When there are enough repeated
games bidders can even develop collusive shading strategies where
bidders actively coordinate to have low bids [16, 23].
Although behavior varies from auction to auction, several studies
have shown that the magnitude of shading tends to increase with
the average price on the auction [4, 6, 17]. This is likely to occur
because of the more substantial losses involved on higher priced
auctions, if shading isn’t sufficient. This result suggests that using
a measure of the expense of the auction is valuable when trying to
estimate the shading factor - a finding we revisit later in Section 6.
In situations where the supply is plentiful, and demand limited,
buyers can shade deeper. In looking at this phenomemon in the US
Treasury Market, Hortacsu et. al. (2017) find that large institutional
buyers on average shade more aggressively than small indirect
buyers [17] . This seems to be because these large buyers effectively
control a large percentage of bidders, and so it is almost like they are
able to coordinate the buying of multiple buyers. They can therefore
drive the bid prices for a large percentage of bidders down, whilst
still meeting their goals.
3.2 Previous Algorithms
In 2018 and 2019, Rubicon [1, 25], AppNexus [3] and Google [14, 15,
28, 30] all released Sell-Side bid shading services. Leading up to this,
there had been reports of dramatically lower ROI from the new First
Price Auctions [18, 21]. Never-the-less, this is a surprising move
as Sell-Side Platforms are potentially decreasing their yield, and
they clearly have a different incentive from buyers. The sell-side
algorithms seem to reflect this incentive difference. The descriptions
of these services suggest that they try to keep bid prices high
enough to maintain a set win-rate, but preventing the bid price
from becoming too extreme; which might risk an advertiser to halt
their bidding due to poor Return on Investment. Rubicon released
data suggesting that their service decreases First Price CPMs by
a modest 5% over 4 months [25]. AppNexus reported that prices
under their service were 25% lower over 100 days [3]. We tried one
of the services, and recorded the shading distribution in Figure 2.
Most of the bid shades were about 90%, which is conservative for
our problem. Further analysis on Sell-Side "Bid Shaders" are in
Section 7.
On the Demand Side, a variety of algorithms have been explored,
although generally not exactly for bid shading applications. [35]
developed a censored winning bid probability estimator. They ob-
served that when a bidder submitted a bid and lost, the information
gained is that the winning price is somewhere above the submitted
price, and when a bidder submits a bid and wins, the minimum bid
to win is at a price somewhere below their submitted bid. Using
these two cases, the authors developed a Maximum Likelihood pro-
cedure to estimate the probability of the winning bid being any of
the bid prices. This created a distribution of the probable winning
bids, with the most likely winning price being used for bidding.
[34] extended their work to using a neural network to estimate the
parameters of the win probability distribution.
An unpublished implementation [19] used Logistic Regression to
predict the optimal bid shading factor using features in the request.
The predicted factor was then used as a multiplier on the unshaded
bid price.
The approaches described above [19, 34, 35] all focus on predict-
ing the probable winning bid price. However, the surplus maximum
is very different from the minimum bid to win. An accurate (unbi-
ased, symmetric noise) win probability estimator will be below the
winning bid price about 50% of the time - this means that 50% of
the surplus won’t be captured by design. If the change in new im-
pressions captured at a higher bid price, over-weights the marginal
decrease in profitability per impression, the optimum for surplus
can be higher than the most probable bid.
Unpublished work [20] is one of the few that we know of to
attempt to explicitly maximize the surplus function. These authors
estimate shading factors for a set of fixed segments based on three
bid samples taken in real-time to estimate the local surplus land-
scape. However the approach has many drawbacks: the segments
have to be predetermined and finding a suitable segment defini-
tion requires substantial analysis. The information across segments
is not shared, which is a problem for segments that do not have
enough traffic. Further, the set of possible segments quickly explode
as the number of variables used to define them increases. The ap-
proach taken in this paper uses a model to estimate the surplus
function, and so a very large number of features can be used, and
model induction is also automated, easy to maintain, and improve.
In order to compare the method we used to prior work, we have
included an implementation of the Logistic Regression algorithm
from [19], the Distribution Estimator algorithm from [35], and the
Segment-based Surplus maximizer [20] in the benchmarks which
we use to analyze algorithm performance in Section 7.
4 CANONICAL ALGORITHM
Given a bid request for First Price Auction, let x1,x2, . . . ,xk be the
set of publisher and user attributes that we will use to find the best
bid price b∗. Let bˆ be the highest bid price from other competing
bidders, which value is unknown. Note that bˆ depends on both
attributes xi s which represent the item that is being auctioned,
and external competing bidder behavior. bˆ follows an unknown
distributionDbˆ |x1,x2, ...,xk with cumulative probability distribution
cdfbˆ |x1,x2, ...,xk . When the context is clear, we use Dbˆ and cdfbˆ for
simplicity.
If the distribution Dbˆ is known, we can calculate the optimal
bid price b∗ directly as follows. Let I(b > bˆ) be 1 if b > bˆ and 0
otherwise, which indicates if the submitted price b wins the auction.
Then the surplus when the submitted price is b would be
surplus = (V − b)I(b > bˆ) =
{
V − b, if b > bˆ,
0, otherwise.
(2)
The optimal bid price can be calculated as the price that maximizes
the expected surplus
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Figure 1: Top: Actual PDF for bˆ (left) versus estimate (right);
middle: CDF actual versus estimate; bottom: Surplus distri-
bution actual versus estimate.
b∗ = argmax
b>0
E[surplus]
= argmax
b>0
E
[
(V − b) I(b > bˆ)
]
= argmax
b>0
(V − b) cdfbˆ (b). (3)
For simple forms of cdfbˆ (b), the optimization problem (3) can be
solved analytically. For example, suppose bˆ distributes uniformly
over the interval [B0,B1], where 0 ≤ B0 < B1. This produces
a cdfbˆ (b) that is piece-wize linear, with a flat region of 0.0 from[0,B0], a constant slope from [B0,B1], and another flat region of
1.0 above B1. The bid price b∗ that maximizes the surplus can be
calculated as below
E[surplus] = (V − b) cdfbˆ (b)
=

0, if b < B0,
(V − b)(b − B0)/(B1 − B0), if B0 ≤ b ≤ B1,
V − b, if b > B1.
It is straightforward to see that
maxE[surplus] =
{ (V−B0)2
4(B1−B0) at b
∗ = V−B02 , if V ≤ 2B1 − B0,
V − B1 at b∗ = B1, if V > 2B1 − B0.
However, in practice, we rarely see such simple form of dis-
tributions. Figure 1 shows an example of the empirical PDF of bˆ,
including the derived surplus distribution.
Our approach breaks into two steps:
Step 1 Estimate the distribution Dbˆ |x1,x2, ...,xk ;
Step 2 Solve the maximization problem (3).
4.1 Distribution Estimation
Given publisher and user attributions x1, . . . ,xk and bid price b,
we first train a classification model with historical data:
Pr(win) = cdfbˆ (b) = F
(
w0 +
k∑
i=1
wixi + β д(b)
)
, (4)
where F is a fitting function that outputs a value between 0 and 1,
which must be monotonically increasing in b (higher bid price leads
to higher winning rate), and д(b) is a bid transformation function
such that F → 0 as b → 0, that is, as bid price goes to 0, the
winning probability also goes to 0, and the weights to be learned
arew0,w1, . . . ,wk and β .
For д(b), we use the logarithm of bid price д(b) = log(b) so that
д(b) → −∞, as b → 0. For F , we use the logistic function [9, 27] so
that F (x) → 0 as x → −∞, with the constraint that β > 0.
Other formsд(b) and F can be explored, but our choices of simple
forms, besides satisfying mentioned constraints, allow the maxi-
mization problem (3) in Step 2 to be solved efficiently. More details
will follow later in Subsection 4.2. With our choice of functions F
and д(b), we have the following win-rate classification model:
Pr(win) =
(
1 + e−(w0+
∑k
i=1wixi+β logb)
)−1
, (5)
which can be trained by gradient descent [9]. Note that the training
should be constrained such that β > 0. In practice we found that
it’s not necessary since our learned β without constraint turns out
always positive.
4.2 Surplus Maximization
With a trained win-rate model from (5), the optimal bid price b∗
can now be found by solving the optimization (3):
b∗ = argmax
b>0
(V − b) logistic
(
w0 +
k∑
i=1
wixi + β logb
)
= argmax
b>0
(V − b)
(
1 + e−w0−
∑k
i=1wixi−β logb
)−1
= argmax
b>0
V − b
1 + e−αb−β
, (6)
where α = w0 +
∑k
i=1wixi .
We show below that, for b > 0, there is a single optimum bid
priceb∗ which can be bounded from above and below. These bounds
make it possible to implement a fast bisection search.
Theorem 1. For any β > 0,
f (b) = V − b
1 + e−αb−β
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is maximized at some unique b∗ such that
β
β + 1 + eαV β
V ≤ b∗ < β
β + 1V .
Proof. Taking the derivative, we have
f ′(b) = βV − (β + 1)b − e
αbβ+1
(1 + e−αb−β )2eαbβ+1 .
Note that the denominator is always positive. Thus to find b∗ that
maximizes f (b) it’s sufficient to consider the sign of
h(b) def= βV − (β + 1)b − eαbβ+1.
Since h(b) is a decreasing function in b, for any b ∈ (0,V ], h(b) can
be bounded as
βV − (β + 1)b − eαV β b ≤ h(b) < βV − (β + 1)b,
which implies that
h
(
β
β + 1 + eαV β
V
)
≥ 0 and h
(
β
β + 1V
)
< 0.
Therefore there is a unique value b∗ ∈
[
β
β+1+eαV β V ,
β
β+1V
)
such
that h(b∗) = 0, and hence f ′(b∗) = 0. In other words, f (b) is
maximized at b = b∗. □
Theorem 1 allows us to implement a fast bisection search algo-
rithm 4.1 for the optimal bid price. Starting with the minimum and
Algorithm 4.1 Bisection Algorithm Surplus Maximization
Require:
1: • Model weights:w0,w1, . . . ,wk , β ;
• Feature values x1,x2, . . . ,xk ;
• V : expected value of the current ad opportunity
• ϵ > 0: minimum valid interval length
• N : maximum number of search steps
Ensure: β > 0,V > 0
2: α ← w0 +∑ki=1wixi .
3: bmin ← ββ+1+eαV β V
4: bmax ← ββ+1V
5: for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N do
6: fpmin ← βV − (β + 1)bmin − eαbβ+1min
7: fpmax ← βV − (β + 1)bmax − eαbβ+1max
8: r ← −fpmin/(fpmax − fpmin)
9: b ← (1 − r )bmin + r bmax
10: fpb← βV − (β + 1)b − eαbβ+1
11: if fpb < 0 then
12: bmin ← b
13: else
14: bmax ← b
15: end if
16: if bmax − bmin < ϵ then
17: break
18: end if
19: end for
return b
maximum bounds on the surplus optimum, bmin =
β
β+1+eαV β V
and bmax = ββ+1V , per Theorem 1, we know that the lower bound
for optimum has positive derivative, and the high bound has nega-
tive. Bisection can divide the range and find the zero point for the
derivative in at most log2[(bmax − bmin)/ϵ] steps; this logarithmic
time is extremely desirable since the maximization search must run
in real-time in the ad-server.
We found in practice that we could use the gradient information
to speed up the search further. Rather than cutting the range in
half each time (r = 0.5; step 8), after testing the gradient of the
minimum and maximum bid points, we use our knowledge that
the surplus function is convex and so derivatives shorten close to
the optimum. We calculate the ratio between the surplus derivative
at min and max bid locations, and then use that estimate for the
relative distance to the optimum in bid space. Steps 8 and 9 of the
pseudo-code show this modification to r . Empirically we observed
that the bisection ends in less 10 iterations to achieve a sufficient
precision, which is controlled by ϵ .
5 IMPLEMENTATION
The features used for predicting win probability comprise 12 vari-
ables extracted from the HTTP of an incoming bid request, along
with log(bid price) and log(bid price before shading).
The HTTP attributes include the requesting page (e.g., yahoo.com),
device type (e.g., desktop), hour of day; day of week, country, user
segment, and other variables. All of the HTTP features are encoded
to be binary variables.
For production we use one week of historical data for training
so that weekly patterns are captured. The training data typically
contain over a billion of bid requests with less than 100K encoded
features. For the curve fit, we used the LogisticRegression method
that is part of the PySpark pyspark.ml.classification library [2],
which is distributed. The training time depends on the number of
allocated machines. With less than 100 machines the training can
finish within a few hours.
At run-time, the shading algorithm needs to respond to millions
of requests per second peak load, within 100 milliseconds for all
systems. In order to meet these speed constraints, bid shading has
to minimize the number of computations that it performs. In terms
of memory, by using a single global model, memory consumption
is kept to less than 100K floating point numbers. In terms of time,
shading optimization averages just less than 20 floating-point oper-
ations per request.
6 SHADING INSIGHTS
Here we describe a few features that we observed to be predictive
in the win-rate model. The numerical features logarithm of bid
price before shading and logarithm of bid price are both highly
predictive1 (w = -0.39 and 0.565; McFadden R2=0.24 and 0.20 respec-
tively [10, 32]). The high predictiveness of bid price before shading
- and yet negative sign when included with bid price - is consistent
with previous observations that bid shading tends to be deeper in
auctions with higher valuations [4, 6, 17].
1In the following, the regression coefficient is labeled w and PR is the observed
positive rate of the binary variable
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The top binary feature in terms of impact on win probability
is is_new_user (w = 0.831; PR=0.52), which is associated with
an increase in chance of winning the auction (since bid prices are
lower). auctions. hour_of_day=6am (user local hour) (w = −0.267;
PR=0.01) is associated with a drop in the probability of winning,
likely due to the reduction in supply [22]. country=US (w = −0.110;
PR=0.84) decreases the chance of winning; and the largest 768x1024
ads also are less likely to be won (w = −0.267; PR=0.01).
The predictability of time, user, and other features, for estimating
auction clearing prices, suggest that shading should be effective, as
noted in work [24] on the preconditions for shading described in
Section 3.
7 COMPARISON TO BENCHMARKS
We ran several of the algorithms in Section 3 as benchmarks. These
included: (1) Sell-Side Shading Service (S4) [1, 3, 14, 15, 25], (2)
Non-linear Segment-Based (SEG) [20], Distribution estimator with
Normal (NRML), Exponential (EXP) Distributions [35], Logistic
Regression (LR) [19] and Unshaded (Uns). The win-rate based algo-
rithm in this paper is labeled WR in the tables to follow.
The prior work benchmarks aren’t ideal - the win distribution
approaches [35] don’t explicitly maximize surplus and so we expect
them to not perform as well. The S4 algorithm seems to be geared
towards maintaining win rate. Nevertheless, we have included them
not only to compare to prior work but also to quantify the gain that
surplus maximization approaches can deliver in practice.
Unlike the other benchmarks, the SEG algorithm does maximize
surplus [20]. Under a favorable selection of segments, the Segment-
Based algorithm might even be tuned to perform as well or better
than the current method, despite the scaling problem with using
more features. Our purpose in showing these benchmarks isn’t
to claim that this particular algorithm outperforms the others in
all metrics, but rather to show that surplus maximizers have an
advantage, to quantify the gain, and to note that WR, which is fully
automated, uses all available features to estimate the surplus land-
scape, and has excellent memory and speed properties, performs
comparable to other reported approaches.
The experiments below (except ones with S4) were run on auc-
tions for which the minimum bid prices to win were known. Using
this data it was possible to calculate surplus performance as a per-
centage of the total optimal surplus:
% opt surplus def=
∑
i (Vi − bi )I(bi > bˆi )∑
i (Vi − bi )
,
i.e., the surplus achieved by a particular algorithm out of total
available surplus by bidding optimally. Spend and impression per-
formances can be defined similarly.
The algorithms were tested on one day of auction data. For fair
comparison training is done on data from the previous day, since not
all algorithms are designed to be trained on multiple days of data.
All the bid requests are scored by each algorithm, so all algorithms
operate on the same set of records. The results are shown in Table
1.
The distribution estimator methods (NRML, EXP) estimate the
minimum bid to win and so are not expected to do well in max-
imizing surplus. As a group they were about 7% below WR. The
Nonlinear Segment method generated the second highest surplus
Metric WR SEG NRML LR EXP Uns
%opt surplus 50.6% 49.0% 48.0% 47.3% 46.0% 0%
%opt spend 41.7% 56.0% 42.7% 39.8% 31.1% 176%
%opt imps 56.6% 49.1% 53.1% 50.3% 42.6% 100%
avg shading factor 0.6 0.55 0.62 0.61 0.42 1.00
Table 1: Benchmark Algorithms
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Figure 2: Shading factor distributions for three algorithms.
S4 has more shallow shading factors.
Metric WR LR SEG Uns
% opt surplus 46.7% 44.8% 38.2% 0.0%
% opt spend 79.1% 72.6% 89.9% 410%
% opt imps 60.3% 51.4% 56.0% 100%
avg shading factor 0.55 0.53 0.59 1.00
Table 2: Production Results
besides WR. This makes sense given that it is a legitimate sur-
plus maximizer. WR generates the highest surplus (50.6%). In sum,
the surplus maximizers produced the most surplus, which was
expected.
We also compared an S4 algorithm from an anonymous SSP. We
had to separate this analysis due to a service issue. When using the
S4 for real-time bidding, the service disabled the minimum bid to
win functionality. As a result, we were unable to do an optimality
analysis.
Overall, the S4 delivered about 15% more impressions than WR
- as noted SSPs have an incentive to try to monetize more traffic.
However it delivered about 4.3% lower surplus. The bidding distri-
bution from the S4 is shown in Figure 2. Whereas the SSP’s shading
distribution is right-skewed, with most shading at 90% and above,
theWR distribution - which generates more surplus - is left-skewed,
with most shades below 72%. It seems likely that the S4 is geared
towards generating high sales, but not necessarily high advertiser
surplus.
8 PRODUCTION RESULTS
After rolling out the WR algorithm, we were able to monitor its
online performance by maintaining a percentage of traffic that was
randomly allocated to each algorithm. The analysis shown in Table 2
spans about two months, during which time all algorithms were
automatically updated at daily basis. Overall WR captured 46.7% of
the maximum possible surplus, whereas Non-linear captured 38%.
Bid prices on WR were about 45% lower than their unshaded prices.
AdKDD ’20, August 2020, San Diego, California, USA S Pan, B Kitts, T Zhou, H He, B Shetty, A Flores, D Gligorijevic, J Pan, T Mao, S Gultekin and J Zhang
A/B Testing Spend Surplus eCPM eCPC eCPA
WR v.s. LR +1.3% +1.4% -7.4% -4.5% -2.7%
WR v.s. SEG +1.2% +2.5% -5.4% -5.5% -3.9%
Table 3: Improvements on Business Metrics
Note that in a real-time bidding system, campaigns usually have
finite budgets, and budget controller is a necessary component
in such a system. The production performance of a bid shading
algorithm relies on how well it works together with the budget
controller. In a simplified view, a reasonable controller is expected
to spend all the daily budget, and hence the budget saved by a
bid shading algorithm, that is, the surplus, would be spent again
to buy more impressions, thus leads to lower eCPM, eCPC, and
eCPA [31]. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, with similar spend WR
achieved significant improvements on these business metrics.
9 CONCLUSION
There is evidence that First Price Auctions have created problems for
advertisers. Average traffic prices are higher, with estimates ranging
between 5% and 50% [3, 18, 21, 25]. [21] also reported that after their
SSP switched to First Price, 10% of advertisers actually discontinued
bidding. Our experiments confirm these findings; without a shading
solution, CPM would approximately double.
DSPs are required to compute the private value of impressions
based on advertiser parameters, and they also execute a large num-
ber of trades, and so can build up an ability to predict auction
prices. This makes it possible to implement rational shading similar
to other industries [16, 17, 23]. Advertiser bids follow the value of
traffic, and this follows daily, hourly, and site patterns. As a result,
auction prices will always have structure that can be used by some
advertisers with other advertisers have less flexibility.
The surplus maximization approach of this paper delivered about
7% higher surplus than naive methods just designed to submit the
probable clearing price. Furthermore, when integrated with budget
controllers, it significantly reduced eCPM, eCPC and eCPA by 3% –
7%. Publicly available data shows medium sized DSPs managing
between 260 to 1 billion US dollars in advertiser spend [33]. The
Shading gains reported in this paper therefore represent 18 to 100
million US dollars in additional yield that is provided to advertisers.
Shading has an enormous impact on advertiser profitability. Now
that the online ad industry has increasingly shifted to First Price
Auctions, it seems likely that the new advertising technology arms
race will be in the domain of bid shading.
REFERENCES
[1] AdExchanger. 2017. Rubicon Joins First-Price Auction Club; Diageo Is Latest
Brand To Demand More Transparency. https://adexchanger.com/ad-exchange-
news/tuesday-12122017/
[2] Apache. PySpark. Source code for pyspark.ml.classification. https://spark.
apache.org/docs/2.1.1/api/python/_modules/pyspark/ml/classification.html
[3] AppNexus. 2018. Demystifying Auction Dynamics for Digital Buyers and Sell-
ers. https://www.appnexus.com/sites/default/files/whitepapers/49344-CM-
Auction-Type-Whitepaper-V9.pdf
[4] Pierpaolo Battigalli and Marciano Siniscalchi. 2003. Rationalizable bidding in
first-price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 45, 1 (2003), 38–72.
[5] E.C. Capen, R.V. Clapp, and W.M. Campbell. 1971. Auctions and Bidding. Journal
of Petroleum Technology 23, 6 (1971), 641–643.
[6] Bhaskar Chakravorti, WilliamW Sharkey, Yossef Spiegel, and SimonWilkie. 1995.
Auctioning the airwaves: the contest for broadband PCS spectrum. Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy 4, 2 (1995), 345–373.
[7] V Chari and Robert Weber. 1992. How the US Treasury should auction its
debt. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 16, 4 (1992), 1–
12. http://kylewoodward.com/blog-data/pdfs/references/chari+weber-quarterly-
review-1992A.pdf
[8] John M Crespi and Richard J Sexton. 2005. A Multinomial logit framework to
estimate bid shading in procurement auctions: Application to cattle sales in the
Texas Panhandle. Review of industrial organization 27, 3 (2005), 253–278.
[9] Julian Faraway. 2006. Extending the Linear Model with R: Generalized Linear,
Mixed Effects and Nonparametric Regression Models. Chapman Hall/CRC Press,
Boca Raton.
[10] Jeremy Freese and J. Scott Long. 2006. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent
Variables Using Stata. Stata Press, College Station, Texas.
[11] Getintent. 2017. RTB Auctions: Fair Play? https://blog.getintent.com/rtb-
auctions-fair-play-3b372d505089
[12] Google. 2018. Form 10K for Alphabet Inc. https://abc.xyz/investor/static/pdf/
20180204_alphabet_10K.pdf?cache=11336e3
[13] Google. 2019. Real Time Bidding Protocol Protocol Buffer v.167.
https://developers.google.com/authorized-buyers/rtb/downloads/realtime-
bidding-proto
[14] Google. 2019. Real Time Bidding Protocol, Release Notes. https://developers.
google.com/authorized-buyers/rtb/relnotes#updates-2019-03-13
[15] Google. 2020. Real-Time Bidding Protocol Buffer v.173. https://developers.
google.com/authorized-buyers/rtb/downloads/realtime-bidding-proto
[16] Kenneth Hendricks and Robert H Porter. 1989. Collusion in auctions. Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique , 15/16 (1989), 217–230.
[17] Ali Hortaçsu, Jakub Kastl, and Allen Zhang. 2018. Bid shading and bidder surplus
in the us treasury auction system. American Economic Review 108, 1 (2018),
147–69.
[18] B. Hovaness. 2018. Sold for more than you should have paid. https://www.hearts-
science.com/sold-for-more-than-you-should-have-paid/
[19] Verizon Media internal report. 2019. Predicting Optimal Bid Shading Factor Using
Logistic Regression.
[20] Niklas Karlsson and Qian Sang. 2020. Adaptive bid shading optimization of first
price ad inventory.
[21] Brendan Kitts. 2019. Bidder Behavior after Shifting from Second to First Price
Auctions in Online Advertising. http://www.appliedaisystems.com/papers/FPA_
Effects33.pdf
[22] Brendan Kitts and Yongbo Zeng. 2019. Lookahead Algorithms for Online Bidding.
[23] Yvan Lengwiler and ElmarWolfstetter. 2010. Auctions and corruption: An analysis
of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer. Journal of Economic Dynamics and control
34, 10 (2010), 1872–1892.
[24] Rachel AJ Pownall and Leonard Wolk. 2013. Bidding behavior and experience in
internet auctions. European Economic Review 61 (2013), 14–27.
[25] Rubicon. 2018. Bridging the Gap to First-Price Auctions: A BuyerâĂŹs
Guide. http://go.rubiconproject.com/rs/958-XBX-033/images/Buyers_Guide_
to_First_Price_Rubicon_Project.pdf
[26] Rubicon. 2018. Principles for a Better Programmatic Marketplace,
Open Letter from Rubicon, SpotX, OpenX, Pubmatic, Telaris, and Sovr.
https://rubiconproject.com/insights/thought-leadership/principles-better-
programmatic-marketplace-open-letter-advertisers-publishers/
[27] Cosma Shalizi. 2020. Logistic Regression Lecture 12. https://www.stat.cmu.edu/
~cshalizi/uADA/12/lectures/ch12.pdf
[28] R. Shields. 2019. Google Ad Manager to Offer First-Price Auctions, Simplifying
Programmatic Buying. https://www.adweek.com/programmatic/google-ad-
manager-to-offer-first-price-auctions-simplifying-programmatic-buying//
[29] S. Sluis. 2017. Explainer: More On The Widespread Fee Practice Behind
The Guardian’s Lawsuit Vs. Rubicon Project. https://adexchanger.com/ad-
exchange-news/explainer-widespread-fee-practice-behind-guardians-lawsuit-
vs-rubicon-project/
[30] S. Sluis. 2019. Google Switches To First-Price Auction. https:
//www.adweek.com/programmatic/google-ad-manager-to-offer-first-price-
auctions-simplifying-programmatic-buying//
[31] Automatad Team. 2018. How to Calculate CPM, CPC, CPA, CR, eCPM, eCPC,
eCPA, and ROI. https://headerbidding.co/calculate-cpm-cpc-cpa-ecpm-ecpc-
ecpa-roi/
[32] UCLA. 2011. What are Pseudo R Squares? https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/other/mult-
pkg/faq/general/faq-what-are-pseudo-r-squareds/
[33] KarstenWeide. 2017. Worldwide Digital Advertising SoftwareMarket Shares 2017.
https://www.criteo.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/US44240218e_Criteo.pdf
[34] WushWu, Mi-Yen Yeh, and Ming-Syan Chen. 2018. Deep censored learning of the
winning price in the real time bidding. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery &DataMining. KDD ’18, London,
United Kingdom, 2526–2535.
[35] Wush Chi-Hsuan Wu, Mi-Yen Yeh, and Ming-Syan Chen. 2015. Predicting win-
ning price in real time bidding with censored data. In Proceedings of the 21th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining.
KDD ’15, Sydney, 1305–1314.
[36] Christine Zulehner. 2009. Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 27, 1 (2009), 33–42.
